Truth as a ‘passionate affirmation of desire’

In William James’ The Will to Believe faith and religion finally move out of the realm of the superstitious and ‘spiritual’ to that of human experience. Religion moves beyond the narrow concept of institutionalized religion, and faith no longer need refer to faith in a supreme being. Truth, knowledge, reality and self are all recognized as being emergent complex culturally constructed notions that are contingent upon their historical and cultural context. There is nothing fixed, static or universal about these ideas. The irrational or ‘non-intellectual’ aspects of our being are acknowledged as being as important (or more so) as our rational side. 

 

Truth exists and is true because “we want to have a truth.” (P 9) James prefaces that comment with the observation that

our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, – what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up? (P 9)

Science for James is only one manifestation of our desire and search for truth and understanding of our situation in the world. Science, mathematics and logic are part and parcel of our ‘selves’ which also develop belief systems and desires, all of which form a complex web of interactions. He suggests that human nature ‘needs’ all of these mechanisms to continue being. Regarding science he states that 

without an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. (P 55)

So, we are inclined to logical explanations, to empirical observations, to theorizing, to believing, to desiring etc. and therefore find those aspects in things and the world around us. It’s just as destructive to treat science and rationality ‘religiously’ as it is to rely on belief and desire irrationally. Reason and passion, science and art, truth and imagination: these all need to be conjoined rather than treated as either/or polarities. Science to James had become estranged from its own purpose in a way. He suggests that science, through a sort of ‘fear’ of being deceived or mistaken, has developed scientific techniques of verification that have become the real goal of science. Science had come to the point that truth in itself was no longer of paramount importance, but rather that “it is only truth as technically verified that [is of] interest…” (P 21)

 

We must move beyond our intellectual capacities because science can only tell us about things which exist. To be able to decide between the value of things (real or imaginary) requires us to use faculties other than logic, mathematics and science. James says that we need to consult what “…pascal calls our heart.” (P 22) Pascal’s notion of the heart enters into moral and aesthetic territory and acknowledges what I have been repeatedly referring to as the ineffable. Science may show us what things consist of, and how to accomplish certain things, but it will always be incapable of telling us why  and what we should do and to evaluate the inherent value in things. 

 

We believe in certain possibilities and so we pursue those very possibilities. Our opinions can become ‘more true’ by pursuing our interests doggedly with whatever faculties we may have and which may prove to be fruitful. We will recognize even the rationality of something only by “…certain subjective marks…which affects [us].” (P 63) We will recognize when things ‘are right’ because they will feel right and the results will be of value to us. Again we’re back to invoking the ineffable. While James recognizes our propensity to scientific exploration and the simplifying nature of categorization he believes (as do I) that we are only willing to simplify things insofar is that provides us with some particular value or use and, importantly, that we reject ideas when they dissolve away “…their concrete fullness.” (P 66). So, the need for simplicity of explanations must be balanced with the fecundity of experience. We desire both and must have faith that our conceptions of the world will constantly renew that balance. 

 

The Forces of Humanity: Michel Serres’ Natural Contract

No longer the heroic individual, the subject, the tribe or society, mankind through relentless population growth has become equivalent in power to the tectonic plates of geology. Through the brilliant metaphor of the “…dense tectonic plates of humanity,” Serres has reconstituted humankind’s relationship to the earth. In Serres’ model, humanity has become a natural force as potentially destructive as any earthquake or meteor strike, as any tsunami or forest fire. Humanity becomes environment: “from now on there will be lakes of humanity, physical actors in the physical system of the Earth. man is a stockpile, the strongest and most connected of nature. He is a being-everywhere. And bound.” (P 18) Nations and continents are weighed upon by humanity: “Europe weighs at least a quarter-billion souls…it behaves like a sea.” (P 16) Humanity through its sheer volume, its size, exists as a physical force.

 

Humanity, through mechanistic and disinterested science has conquered nature. The Cartesian and Baconian project of the production of order, of mastery of the natural, of the cultivation and control of nature through mathematical reason and science has come to full fruition and we no longer experience ‘nature’ as natural any more. The developed world, living in cities, no longer has direct experiential connection to our own sustenance. “The climate never influences our work anymore.” (P 28) We industrially cultivate land to provide us with what we need. Any land that can’t be cultivated has long been relegated to the realm of the ‘useless,’ now only to provide places to pollute without affecting us individually or in our collectivity: the wasteland of the deserts and the polar ice caps. The essential in our societies takes place indoors: we no longer have a relationship with nature: “we communicate irrepressibly. We busy ourselves only with our own networks.” (P 29) Wild weather, geo-thermal disasters, and other forces of nature now collide with the plates of humanity. We only notice ‘nature’ when it ‘misbehaves,’ reminding us of its existence. 

 

Serres is suggesting that we have moved from cosmologies where ‘God’ is at the center of the universe, to where ‘man’ is at the center, and that now, we must move to a model where the Earth and its things must be at the center and humankind at the edges. Or as he puts it, “…things all around and us within them like parasites.” (P 33). The parasite is, of course, abusive by nature. The parasite destroys its host even though that means the extermination of the parasite itself. Serres posits a contractual metaphor for our relationship to the earth when he says: “law tries to limit abusive parasitism among men but does not speak of this same action on things. If objects themselves become legal subjects, then all scales will tend toward an equilibrium.” (P 37) At this point we haven’t included the ‘world’ in our legal models. To Serres, objects must become legal subjects for any change to occur. The objects of the world can’t be relegated to forms of appropriation. 

 

A call to arms then!

Back to nature, then! That means we must add to the exclusively social contract a natural contract of symbiosis and reciprocity in which our relationship to things would set aside mastery and possession in favor of admiring attention, reciprocity, contemplation, and respect; where knowledge would no longer imply property, nor action mastery, nor would property and mastery imply their excremental results and origins. An armistice contract in the objective war, a contract of symbiosis, for a symbiont recognizes the host’s rights, whereas a parasite-which is what we are now-condemns to death the one he pillages and inhabits, not realizing that in the long run he’s condemning himself to death too. (P 38)

Serres may be an optimist in making this call. What makes him think that there’s something we can do to stop environmental destruction? Can a parasite change its parasitic ways? Can natural forces do anything other than what they do? If humankind is a parasitic natural force then what makes anyone think that this could change? How fated are we to our own ‘natures?’ 

 

Serres is saying that in our exclusively social contracts we have left the world out of our plans. A natural contract would ostensibly re-establish a relationship between humanity and the objects of the world we live in. So, perhaps we are not parasites by nature, but have become parasitic by dismissing our relationship to the world. Maybe we need to reconsider the Cartesian mind/body dualism as something more disjunctive: a mind/body/world ‘tri-alism’ (? maybe trichotomy? Hmmm). Maybe we have made a split artificially between mind and body and the environment around us. Many currently would say in response to the Cartesian project that the mind and body have never been separate and that we should go further to say that the mind, body and world have never really been separate. What constitutes the boundaries between these so-called separate entities? By focusing on the mind/body ‘split’ and its reconstitution we have been leaving the world out of the equation. Human being has been dis-placed and needs to find its place in the world again. If we are to  move away from a parasitic reality the world has to become central to us.

Darwin’s Language of Evolution

Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was a ground breaking book in many respects. Certainly what he was proposing was new. The implications for the future were enormous, particularly regarding genetic modification and the ethical issues we currently face in that arena. How he proposed it all though was firmly anchored in the harbour of Baconian science in terms of his language and methodology. He relies explicitly on inductive reasoning as Bacon proposes science should. His use of language and reason have an overtly anthropocentric bias as well.

 

Darwin uses anthropocentric language throughout the book. A typical example can be found in the chapter entitled The Struggle for Existence. The chapter title sets the tone. While he explicitly acknowledges that he is using the chapter title “…in a large and metaphorical sense…” (P 165) he does rely on this, and similar, metaphor throughout. I somehow doubt that plants are actually struggling to reach the sun. They simply grow to reach the sun successfully or they do not and die as a result.  He doesn’t go as far as ascribing a will to plants at least!

 

The metaphor of struggle though ties the conception of evolution to ‘man’s’ goals. If a plant struggles, then only the fit plants survive, as is the case with nations: a model of social advance if you will. There is an unspoken dark side with ethical implications to all of this. If our society has overcome many obstacles to living and has significantly lessened peoples’ struggle then how does natural selection continue its project? Perhaps by developing advanced medicine we are allowing the notion of helping the ‘unfit’ to live, which could be seen as going against ‘human nature.’ How many genocidal fantasies could this view fuel?

 

What is humankind’s role in evolution? Is there one at all? Is nature a machine that just runs on its own? Is there a role for God in all of this? Darwin regularly refers to the evolutionary process as attempting to achieve ‘perfection.’ In relation to what? Similarly he often associates beauty with natural complexity. Perhaps unwittingly there’s an aesthetic aspect to Darwin’s science. This science is presented as the ultimate story in opposition to previous creation mythologies. The mythology of science then, as the ultimate arbiter or revealer of truth. This could be an interesting avenue to explore. Darwin, like Bacon, present their science as dispassionate by nature. Perhaps we can see this dispassionate science as leading us to potential disaster and possible annihilation by being guided by a simply mechanistic model of the universe. Maybe the small aesthetic inklings in Darwin’s language constitute an unwitting recognition of the problem with a dispassionate science. 

 

Maybe an ‘aesthetics of science’ needs to be developed (I’ll do a search to see if this has been pursued by anyone: if anyone knows of any references regarding this please drop a comment!)! An aesthetics (or erotics?- let’s embody science!) of science would allow a non-instrumental view of science. Currently science and all of its associated technological development has an overtly instrumental bias. This narrow view may be at the root of some of the problems of the mechanistic, Baconian science that is Darwin’s pedigree. 

 

 

Merchant’s Paridigms of Nature and Use of Reason

Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature is a compelling study of how shifting views of nature have influenced human thought and action throughout the centuries in Europe. She argues that an organic cosmology was eventually supplanted by a mechanistic model of nature sometime between 1500 and 1700. She suggests that to understand this paradigm shift one needs to adopt an ecological perspective. By this she means taking “…an earth’s-eye view of history.” (P 42) With this change in perspective “historical change becomes ecological change, emphasizing human impact on the system as a whole…. Instead of dichotomizing nature and culture as a structural dualism, it sees natural and cultural subsystems in dynamic interaction.” (P 43) Merchant sees the historical subjugation of women in European society as tightly intertwined with this shift, as ‘natural’ concepts of nature-as-woman were replaced by mechanistic models which tacitly gave ‘permission’ to control and exploit natural (and feminine!) resources. Nature was no longer seen as a vital living organism, but rather, as a clockwork mechanism whose parts can be interchanged at will and ad infinitum: this is what constitutes Merchant’s ‘death of nature.’ Concomitant with this change was a change in the concept of self “…as a rational master of the passions housed in a machinelike body…[rather than] as an integral part of a close-knit harmony of organic parts united to the cosmos and society.” (P 214)

 

For all her criticism of science’s mechanistic views of our world, Merchant’s book has a tone of scientific authority throughout. She presents a homogeneous, compelling and seemingly irrefutable argument. Her extensive research and painstakingly precise arguments present a very linear, progressive narrative throughout and by association projects that linearity onto Western European history. She seems to adopt, consciously or otherwise, a Cartesian form of deductive reason and explanation. She posits premises, makes a mathematically logical argument and then comes to conclusions. In doing this she presents models or paradigms either explicitly or implicitly. She uses the very methods of those she criticizes to undermine their positions (this isn’t a criticism on my part!) which brings to the foreground the deeply constitutive nature of models or world views. 

 

This method of argumentation, while effective in its relentless linearity, leaves some assumptions unsaid. Implied in her view point (and in common with Descartes etc.) is that what isn’t rationally knowable isn’t knowable at all. More aggressively put, one could say that what isn’t rationally knowable doesn’t constitute knowledge in any way. Anything outside of this mathematically mechanistic rationality becomes either wholly subjective, and therefore considered valueless for humankind, or is ascribed to ‘the divine,’ in which case it becomes unassailable. The subjective becomes marginalized. The human perspective through perception and the subjective is devalued in this model. 

 

At the same time Merchant uses metaphor and imagery throughout the book. Metaphor is very effectively and transparently used, although often on further reflection it seems that metaphor leads the argument in an insidious way. An example where Merchant’s use of metaphor seems to be a stretch occurs on page 171 where she states:

Here, in bold sexual imagery, is the key feature of the modern experimental method-constraint of nature in the laboratory, dissection by hand and mind, and the penetration of hidden secrets-language still used today in praising a scientist’s ‘hard facts,’ penetrating mind,’ or the ‘thrust of his argument.’ The constraints against penetration in Natura’s lament over her torn garments of modesty have been turned into sanctions in language that legitimates the exploitation and ‘rape’ of nature for human good.

Interesting use of imagery! It does smack somewhat though, of adolescent word play and doesn’t (at least for me) constitute much of an argument or any form of legitimation at all. 

 

From even this one example it is clear that Merchant values her imagination and uses it effectively in developing her arguments. Imagination and reason seem more closely allied than she and Descartes et al would likely be willing to admit. 

 

So how rational is reason? There seems to be a strong component of irrationality in not only Merchant’s arguments but all those she cites and all of the texts we’ve been reading during this course as well. Emotions and hunches seem to figure prominently in all of these thinkers’ writings. The leaps of logic required to generate thought that is genuinely new seems to be an intrinsic part of the thinking process: reason and emotion seem very tightly integrated. 

 

There are intimations of value throughout the book and these ideas as well. There seems to be no value ascribed to something unless it is clearly practical: that there is a clearly defined use-value. This is a very utilitarian view of value, but seems to be dominant in our society. To a large degree many see uncultivated nature as having no value. There have been numerous proposals to dump garbage and toxic wastes in the ‘wasteland’ of our deserts and polar ice-caps. Because these areas aren’t amenable to cultivation and human habitation they’re seen as being useless for anything but dumping waste materials. 

 

So, are there other value systems and are they as important (as valuable) as use-value? I have no immediate answers to this, but it seems a question worth pursuing.

 

 

Science, Reason and Humanism: thoughts on Bacon and Descartes

The 17th century, under the influence of writers like Bacon and Descartes, saw a paradigm shift into an era of humanism: a move away from the centrality of the Divine to the supremacy of the individual, scientific method, and human concerns. The self, albeit disembodied, became the center of experience and of knowledge. Through primarily visual observation of logically devised experiments nature was to be apprehended, controlled and ordered.

 

Bacon in The Great Instauration states his intent unequivocally as follows:

For the end which this science of mine proposes is the invention not of arguments but of arts, not of things in accordance with principles, but of principles themselves; not of probable reasons, but of designations and directions for works. And as the intention is different, so accordingly is the effect; the effect of the one being to overcome an opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action. (P 21)

To command nature in action! No mincing of words here. The purpose of Baconian science is clearly to control and order nature for the use(s) of humankind. His method of choice was inductive reason: one based on empirical observation of carefully constructed experimental procedures. He insisted on what he felt was a new form of induction though: one “…which shall analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.” (P 23) Bacon explicitly rejected deductive reasoning. (P 22) He didn’t accept the a priori as acceptable ‘proof’ of anything. 

 

In developing his experimental method, Bacon also largely dismissed the senses except for their role in observing experiments themselves. The result of the experiment was to be supreme. And as far as the senses go, Bacon had a clear visual bias. He states in no uncertain terms that he will “…admit nothing but on the faith of eyes…” (P 29) Visual observation was central to his evaluation of experimental results. Visual confirmation of repeatable experiments was central to his, and our, scientific method. The senses being suspect and needing logical experiments to determine truth was an early step in disembodying the mind.

 

Descartes, in Discourse on Method, made the disembodied soul central to his conception of truth and knowledge. His famous cogito ergo sum made the split between mind and body complete. The senses again are suspect because they “…sometimes deceive us…” (P 24) The only thing Descartes could be sure of was that he was thinking. The body and its senses were not central to his notion of being or our experience of place. Reason was the ultimate arbiter of truth. He specifically rejects the role of the senses and of imagination in determining ‘truth.’ (P 29)

 

This emphasis on the 1st person present tense, establishes a strong move towards an anthropocentric, humanist view. This marks a profound ascendancy of the individual, or the centrality of human thought and experience rather than that of the divine. This allows a movement from sacred and social duty to the importance of individual self-fulfillment. We may be seeing the inevitable result of this progression in the continuing development of humanism to our time, where self-fulfillment of the individual may be the primary motivating force in people’s lives. 

 

Reason in Plato & Lucretius

Observations on The Timaeus and On The Nature Of Things.

It must be the historical distance from these writers that makes the use of the term ‘reason’ or ‘science’ very strange. The reasoning or logic in these two works seem hardly scientific in the current sense of the term. There seems to be a disdain for empirical observation and experimentation in the science of Plato and Lucretius: they both rely heavily on a priori reason to build their arguments and come to ‘conclusions.’

 

There are differences in their approaches though. Lucretius is certainly more concerned with observable phenomena than Plato, and so has a somewhat more empirical bent to his arguments. Because of this, Plato’s reasoning can be seen to take a more ‘top down’ approach as opposed to Lucretius’ ‘bottom-up’ approach. Lucretius is concerned with emphasizing the importance for each individual in a society of pursuing and exhibiting exemplary behaviour. Were all citizens to follow that directive then society would organize itself accordingly. Plato sees the state and it’s laws as the major factors in determining the behaviour of individuals. For Plato, the idea of individuals determining the behaviour of the state is absurd. 

 

Still, the forms of reasoning found in these and other classical texts seem odd to me in most cases. There seems to be a mania for unified theories to explain everything. So while what each writer is trying to say varies, their reasoning processes have much in common and are dominated by the search for single unifying principles. Their use of rhetorical devices to lead the argument and substantiate various premises seem benign on the surface, but are quite misleading when observed more closely. To avoid the infinite regress problem in their search for ‘first principles’ ‘God’ always ends up being the cause.

 

An example of odd reasoning: in Plato’s Timaeus section 44 (P 111) regarding ‘diseases of the body’ he says: “The origin of diseases should be obvious. The body is composed of four elements-earth, fire, air, and water; and disorders and diseases are caused by an unnatural excess or deficiency of any of them,…” I’m not sure how any of this is ‘obvious’ by any means. This could only be obvious to one situated in that particular historical and cultural context. How would one go about experimentally verifying such suppositions?

 

Lucretius, who doesn’t apparently depend on a particular ‘God’ (although his thought seems fairly mono-theistic) develops a system of principles based on arguments with an internal, almost mathematical precision, yet without ‘real’ explanations of the initial causes of phenomena. He makes simple assertions based on observed phenomena without pursuing what could be called scientific or experimental justifications. Lines 89-142 provide a good example of these assertions. He advises us to “…remember that the whole universe has no bottom and thus no place where the ultimate particles could settle;…” and then adds “since this is an established fact…” These ideas are speculations without any form of verification, yet his whole atomic theory is based on such ‘facts.’ He builds a sort of internal cohesion in his system and that in itself suffices as ‘explanation.’ From this observation he elaborates a theory of how various substances have come to be dependent on the movement of ultimate particles. If one accepts his initial proposition then there is a coherency to the model, but he offers no good reason to accept those propositions at all.  Reason and speculation don’t seem very far apart in the thought of these two writers. 

 

Further on Paine

 

• Class discussion.

 

• The relationship between organized religion and the social order.

 

• Importance of the 1st amendment and the ‘establishment clause’ specifying the separation of state and religion
  • Because of his imprisonment in France, Paine really needed to invalidate the marriage of church and state which resulted in his imprisonment

 

• What is the meaning of God?
  • See also Thomas Jefferson

 

• What would be an appropriate God for rational people

 

• Democratization of God

 

• The New Testament
  • Paine’s criticisms of the inconsistencies between the four gospels
  • Perhaps the new Testament is the 1st postmodern text!? Offers a polyvalent view of Christ’s life in a fragmented, contingent, postmodern way.

 

• The 18th century’s return to Plato is evident from the text.
  • See Charles Taylor re ‘authenticity’ or sincerity
    • Re Paine Part I, Page 2 “…mentally faithful to oneself”
    • The notion of self actualization

 

• Job ch. 18 and Psalm 19 were of particular importance to Paine. 

 

 

Further Reflections on Freud

The class noted that Freud was a very ideological writer: he had a clear theory or frame regarding culture and humanity.The question arose: what does psychoanalysis accomplish?

Exception was taken to Freud’s statement that the “…masses are lazy and unintelligent….” (P 8 Debate went back and forth between Freud’s view and considering whether people would do more work than necessary for subsistence if they weren’t coerced to do so. This brought to mind the question of what do we consider ‘work?’ My initial feeling was that people would eventually get bored of ‘relaxing’ and begin working on projects of some sort: building things, making music or other art, inventing tools and machines to make work easier etc. Many felt that that didn’t qualify as work: that I was describing leisure activities. This could be a possible functioning definition of work I suppose, although somehow it still smacks of something artificial. But, if we strictly define work as that which is required for subsistence then perhaps it’ll go. Cultures have in most (or even all?) cases developed art forms and other such ‘leisure’ activities, even when under the utmost duress regarding their subsistence and welfare. Perhaps there is something very fundamental to subsistence in so called leisure activities!? 

Freud states that civilization renounces or inhibits our instincts. For this to work (ie for us to go along with having our instincts inhibited) we need some form of compensation to ensure that we behave appropriately for the society.  In chapter II Freud rejects the essentially Marxist premise that civilization and the compensation it offers is based solely on the acquisition of wealth and its distribution. He suggests that compensation comes from “…the mental assets of civilization.” (P 12) Freud’s take on what those base instincts consist in is fairly pessimistic: incest, cannibalism and murder. This is why civilization is necessary: to inhibit these instincts in people. Civilization coerces people into repressing those base instincts. This process of coercion becomes gradually internalized to the super-ego. The super-ego is each individual’s ultimate editor and keeps the base instincts in check.  Freud does make a slight nod to Marx in recognizing the role of the distribution of wealth in civilization when he states “If, however, a culture has not got beyond a point at which the satisfaction of one portion of its participants depends upon the suppression of another, and perhaps larger, portion-and this is the case in all present-day cultures-it is understandable that the suppressed people should develop an intense hostility towards a culture whose existence they make possible by their work, but in whose wealth they have too small a share. In such conditions an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed people is not to be expected. ” (P 15)

 

But, going back to what compensations are offered by civilization for us to willingly supress our more unsavoury base instincts. Freud says that at the simplest level, civilization offers us the security of collective living and the possibility of creativity. Creativity can be expressed or developed in the arena of religious ideas, ideals, artistic creations and morals: what Freud refers to as the “…psychical inventory of a civilization.” (P 17) The more we ‘buy in’ to the satisfactions offered by these areas the more robust our super-ego and therefore the more robust and secure the associated cultural unit. Freud distinguishes art as being fundamentally elitist as it “…remains inaccessible to the masses, who are engaged in exhausting work…” and considers religion as illusory. (P 17)

So Much For Gideon

If Paine’s ideas had been universally accepted then we wouldn’t see Gideon Bibles in motels everywhere! Universal Nature would be the only Bible any of us needed: not the paltry confused words of humans. Maybe we would have Paine’s The Age of Reason in those drawers instead.

 

Paine rejected the a priori method of reasoning and instead based everything on experience, and most importantly, evidence. He strongly believed in universals, for example “…upright and equal government…” (Intro P 6) His beliefs are clearly and simply laid out:

I believe in one God, and no more; and I hope for happiness beyond this life. I believe the equality of man, and I believe that religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, and endeavoring to make our fellow-creatures happy. (Pt.1, P 2)      

So he’s a deist who believes in an afterlife and in the equality and intrinsic goodness of humankind. Interestingly he doesn’t extend his desire to “…make our fellow-creatures happy” to his enemies. He states that that’s absurd (citation?) and is in line with Freud on the issue. Tangential point though. 

 

Paine has nothing good to say about the church: in fact quite the opposite when he states in unequivocal terms that “all national institutions of churches…appear to me no other than human inventions set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolize power and profit.” (Pt.1, P 2) He does quickly follow up by saying that “I do not mean by this declaration to condemn those who believe otherwise; they have the same right to their belief as I have to mine.” (Pt.1, P2) This brings me back to Zizek’s Defenders of the Faith article from the previous post, regarding the modern role of atheism in fostering plurality. Provocative as that article may be, I see some truth to the claim. He continues right away in saying that “…it is necessary to the happiness of man, that he be mentally faithful to himself.” (Pt.1, P 2) (This reminds me of Heidegger’s requirement of ‘authenticity:’ something that I shall look into asap to make sure I’m remembering correctly. If anyone knows the reference I’d love some help!). For Paine the church is an abject institution whose purpose is the maintenance of power and order.  To wit, and in no uncertain terms, Christianity

as an engine of power,… serves the purpose of despotism; and as a means of wealth, the avarice of priests; but so far as respect the good of man in general, it leads to nothing here or hereafter…[and further] it has been the scheme of the Christian church, and of all the other invented systems of religion, to hold man in ignorance of the Creator, as it is of government to hold him in ignorance of his rights. The systems of the one are as false as those of the other, and are calculated for mutual support. (Pt.2, P35)  

 Reason, evidence and science are everything in Paine’s theology. Paine characterizes reason as “…the choicest gift of God to man…” (Pt.1 P 14) and further that “it is only by the exercise of reason, that man can discover God.” Paine rejects the Bible because it consists in the unverifiable words of men of questionable intent. Much of the book goes through detailed arguments (particularly in Part 2) showing the inconsistencies and the logical impossibilities of what is written in the Bible. Paine most certainly maintains a mechanistic world view which is consistent with this form of essentially Cartesian reason. He says, point blank, the “The Almighty is the great mechanic of the creation…” (Pt. 2, P36) For him, mathematics is the root of science and “…the offspring of this science is mechanics….” (Pt.1, P 19) Science cannot be an invention of man according to Paine, because science and mathematics are universal and “man cannot invent any thing that is eternal and immutable…” (Pt.1, P 18)

 

To Paine, the only Bible is the natural world, which it is our role to discover, thereby coming to know God. He believes that each person can discover this for themselves and need no intervention by a priest, pope etc. Man is to use the principles of science to discover the organizing principles of the natural world, and by this alone, commune with God. To Paine, Creation

…is an ever existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it cannot be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it cannot be altered; it cannot be suppressed…. It preaches to all nations and to all worlds; and this word of God reveals to man all that is necessary for man to know of God.(Pt.1, P15)  

There is no mincing of words here! Paine believes that God is universal, and while he allows for everyone to have their own beliefs, he clearly asserts that one God, through Creation, speaks to all humankind. One wonders if he’d still hold this view today, with large scale environmental destruction, genetic modification and cloning? Maybe the world can be forged and altered after all.

 

Paine’s reason is that of a disembodied mind; it is mathematical and mechanistic. His criticisms of the Bible often point to its dependence on narrative, on the poetry of prophets and of the fictional nature of the Bible. Interestingly, his own model is very textually oriented! He refers to the Creation as a Bible which is “…inexhaustible in texts…[and further that it] is a text as well for devotion as for philosophy–for gratitude, as for human improvement.”(Pt.2, P 36) This strong textual bias is peculiar in comparison to his critique of the Bible’s textuality. Paine’s logic is essentially language-based: a discursive conceptual-propositional view of knowledge, and one that doesn’t admit of metaphor and poetry! He summarily dismisses the poetic and metaphorical aspects of the Bible as meaningless. But, isn’t science itself somewhat metaphorical? Doesn’t science posit models of the world and then create ways to show or transmit that idea? Is there not a (perhaps intrinsically) aesthetic aspect to human knowledge and understanding? The primacy of science perhaps doesn’t have to be at odds with a primacy of poetry. Both artistic endeavour and scientific endevour seem to offer models of experiencing, and thereby coming to know, our world.

Freud’s Future of an Illusion

This constitutes one of Freud’s major critiques of religion in general and European forms of Christianity in particular. Freud conducts an investigation of sorts to answer the question: “In what does the peculiar value of religious ideas lie?” (P 18). Freud suggests that the role of religion is similar to that of civilization in general and comes down to protecting us from nature. He suggests that by humanizing nature we are removing nature from the realm of impersonal forces which can’t be dealt with. By humanizing them and attributing ‘passions’ to nature we can now view nature as having a will. This is an interesting connection with Carolyn Merchant’s thought regarding the power of paradigms of nature in shaping our behaviour. (See The Death of Nature).We are now at the mercy of nature, which means that nature may be benevolent and ‘spare’ us death and destruction, it could also be wrathful and Evil in causing death and destruction. Freud says that we have an “…infantile prototype…” (P 21) for this: the model of a small child in relation to a parent. We look to our parent for both mercy and protection and, as well, an assurance of a good future. Freud suggests that religion provides us a “…store of ideas…born from man’s need to make his helplessness tolerable…” (P 23) Freud also suggests here that the ‘soul’ or the ‘spiritual’ has become increasingly disembodied by religion’s positing of the eternal and the possibility of transcendence. Perhaps religion attempts dealing with ‘the ineffable’ in this way. (This needs further investigation and fleshing out).

The ‘personal’ God of Christianity allows the possibility of recovering “…the intimacy and intensity of the child’s relation to his father.” (P 24)Freud suggests that religion is “…prized as the most precious possession of civilization…” (P 25) While this is no doubt true, I find Slavoj Zizek’s short op-ed piece Defenders of the Faith regarding the European legacy of atheism rings most true today.Chapter V opens in an interesting way which brings up issues regarding reality and knowledge. Freud states that:

Religious ideas are teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to one’s belief. (P 31)          

I found myself considering what else may fit in for ‘religious ideas.’ Scientific ideas, artistic or aesthetic ideas, philosophical ideas, even TV ‘worked’ in some sense when swapped in for ‘religious ideas.’Freud goes on to investigate how we corroborate or trust other forms of knowledge acquisition. His example is geography and he concludes that while all teachings require belief in what they’re asserting, we don’t believe these assertions until the teacher has produced some grounds for truth claims. Freud is very much in line with Thomas Paine’s reasoning in The Age of Reason regarding the inability or unwillingness of religious teachers and texts to provide grounds for belief without circular reasoning (a proposition cannot be a proof of itself etc) or unjustified trust in sources.

Freud continues on and comes to the conclusion that religious belief cannot be proven by reason, and that claims that religion is ‘above’ reason make it impossible to prove or disprove religious feelings to someone who doesn’t have them. He acknowledges that religion still has had, and continues to have a major influence on humankind. So Freud’s big question is what is it about religion that allows this to happen?The strength of religion is tied to the strength of our wishes according to Freud. Religion is based on illusions. Freud does point out that illusions are very different from errors because an illusion may turn out to be true whereas an error cannot. Illusions though, like religion, comes from human wishes. This brings up interesting issues regarding the role of the arts in articulating ideas which may (or may not) be realizable. Is the aesthetic impulse essentially the same as the religious impulse? Are both art and religion attempting to confront, or categorize or situate etc the ineffable? Reason clearly needs grounds for its proofs, and so may only be appropriate for certain areas of inquiry. All areas or issues outside of logic and reason perhaps require other forms of confrontation.

Freud is clearly for scientific inquiry and methodology. So much so that he maintains the objective/subjective polarity, not noticing that science as well as religion impose the structures of our own ‘mental life’ on the world. (P 40) He suggests on p 47 that “…psycho-analysis is a method of research, an impartial instrument…” It seems somehow amazing to me that he could consider psycho-analysis as an impartial instrument. Heisenberg famously suggested that by our very act of observation the system being observed has changed.Freud reaches an interesting conclusion regarding a psycho-analytical view of religion. He states that “religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity…” (P 55) He comes to this conclusion in the midst of the psycho-analysis of culture and suggests that society at large is at that stage of ‘development’ and that we can expect to get beyond this at some point in the same way as a child outgrows his childhood neuroses and becomes an adult. The issue of using analogies has come up before regarding their applicability to different domains. I suppose the jury’s out on this still. It could be a potentially powerful model for viewing society and culture. Freud himself is aware of this. (P 56)

Freud emphasizes the need for education (P 66) and asserts that religion is not the path to becoming educated because “…in the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too palpable.” (P 69) For Freud, science must be the basis of education, our basis for gaining knowledge of the outer world. In the final pages of the book he touches on some interesting issues regarding the necessarily anthropomorphic view of science itself. If even science is essentially anthropic then how can we know anything of the outside world? He grants this point and says that

…our mental apparatus has been developed precisely in the attempt to explore the external world, and it must therefore have realized in its structure some degree of expediency; in the second place, it is itself a constituent part of the world which we set out to investigate, and it readily admits of such an investigation…[and] precisely because of the way in which [the ultimate findings of science] are acquired, are determined not only by our organization but by the things which have affected that organization; finally, the problem of the nature of the world without regard to our percipient mental apparatus is an empty abstraction, devoid of practical interest.      

This final point is something that has come up in class discussions before. We’ve several times gone to the perspective of wondering what the constitution of the natural world would be without our being here to perceive it, and each time we’ve rejected that as not only ultimately uninteresting, but unknowable. We ‘know’ through our senses and mental apparatus as well as through our conceptual models and technologies etc. And that is what we are, or maybe should be, most interested in.