Science, Reason and Humanism: thoughts on Bacon and Descartes
The 17th century, under the influence of writers like Bacon and Descartes, saw a paradigm shift into an era of humanism: a move away from the centrality of the Divine to the supremacy of the individual, scientific method, and human concerns. The self, albeit disembodied, became the center of experience and of knowledge. Through primarily visual observation of logically devised experiments nature was to be apprehended, controlled and ordered.
Bacon in The Great Instauration states his intent unequivocally as follows:
For the end which this science of mine proposes is the invention not of arguments but of arts, not of things in accordance with principles, but of principles themselves; not of probable reasons, but of designations and directions for works. And as the intention is different, so accordingly is the effect; the effect of the one being to overcome an opponent in argument, of the other to command nature in action. (P 21)
To command nature in action! No mincing of words here. The purpose of Baconian science is clearly to control and order nature for the use(s) of humankind. His method of choice was inductive reason: one based on empirical observation of carefully constructed experimental procedures. He insisted on what he felt was a new form of induction though: one “…which shall analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.” (P 23) Bacon explicitly rejected deductive reasoning. (P 22) He didn’t accept the a priori as acceptable ‘proof’ of anything.
In developing his experimental method, Bacon also largely dismissed the senses except for their role in observing experiments themselves. The result of the experiment was to be supreme. And as far as the senses go, Bacon had a clear visual bias. He states in no uncertain terms that he will “…admit nothing but on the faith of eyes…” (P 29) Visual observation was central to his evaluation of experimental results. Visual confirmation of repeatable experiments was central to his, and our, scientific method. The senses being suspect and needing logical experiments to determine truth was an early step in disembodying the mind.
Descartes, in Discourse on Method, made the disembodied soul central to his conception of truth and knowledge. His famous cogito ergo sum made the split between mind and body complete. The senses again are suspect because they “…sometimes deceive us…” (P 24) The only thing Descartes could be sure of was that he was thinking. The body and its senses were not central to his notion of being or our experience of place. Reason was the ultimate arbiter of truth. He specifically rejects the role of the senses and of imagination in determining ‘truth.’ (P 29)
This emphasis on the 1st person present tense, establishes a strong move towards an anthropocentric, humanist view. This marks a profound ascendancy of the individual, or the centrality of human thought and experience rather than that of the divine. This allows a movement from sacred and social duty to the importance of individual self-fulfillment. We may be seeing the inevitable result of this progression in the continuing development of humanism to our time, where self-fulfillment of the individual may be the primary motivating force in people’s lives.